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  Rationality has long been a key assumption of modern economics. If rational economic 
agents process information efficiently and there are complete capital markets and well defined 
property rights, then economic theory directly supports a laissez faire policy. The role of 
government is limited to enforcing contracts and protecting property rights. Given the 
importance of this key assumption, numerous studies recently have examined its empirical 
validity and have discovered some evidence of limited rationality or limited information 
efficiency.  
For example, in behavioral finance, several studies have provided evidence suggesting 
that investors on average do not discount sufficiently the incentives of interested parties, such as 
firms, brokers, and analysts, to manipulate the information they provide.1 Womack (1996) finds 
that securities analysts are biased in their forecasts and recommendations. Stock 
recommendations favor buys over sells. John Capstaff, Krishna Paudyal, William P. Rees, 
(1998) and Lawrence D. Brown, (2001) also discover that earnings forecasts are generally 
optimistic, especially at long time horizons. These biases may result from agency problems. 
Information is manipulated in order to drum up investment banking business,2 to maintain access 
to information, or to stimulate trading by investors. (See for example, Rachel M. Hayes, (1998), 
Terence Lim (2001), and Roni Michaely and Kent L. Womack (1999))  
  While it is not surprising that agency problems could result in analyst biases, an 
important question is whether investors are gullible. Siew Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch, T.J. Wong 
(1998a, b) and Srinivasan Rangan (1998) discover that investors can be influenced by analyst 
forecasts and do not adequately discount for earnings manipulation at time of IPOs or seasoned 
equity issues. They show that greater earnings management at the time of these equity issues is 
associated with more adverse subsequent long-run abnormal stock returns. In a separate study, 
Christopher Avery and Judith Chevalier (1999) also find that prices in football markets are 
influenced by investors’ mistaken belief in ‘hot hands’ and they tend to overweigh meaningless 
‘expert opinions’. These researchers note that cognitive limitations make it hard for economic 
agents to make the appropriate adjustments for the biases systematically. Critics, however, point 
                                                 
1 For an extensive literature survey of behavioral finance, see Daniel, Kent, David Hirshleifer, and Siew Hong Teoh 
(2002).  
2 Numerous telecom analysts were alleged or found to have inflated earnings forecasts for companies such as Global 
Crossing, Quest, Worldcom and Winstar. Despite mounting loss and falling revenues, many continued their buy 
recommendation for investors until their bankruptcy.  
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out that survivorship issues may create statistical problems for some of the above studies 
involving long-horizon returns (see S.P. Kothari (1999)). Moreover, the results of Michael P. 
Keane and David E. Runkle (1998) even cast doubt on the existence of bias in analysts’ 
forecasts. 
 This paper will join the investigation by employing a new data set from a different field 
(art auctions) to examine the credulity of art investors. While action houses typically made no 
price estimates before 1973, they start providing high- and low- price estimates for all artworks 
thereafter. Thus, we have a natural experiment to observe changes in price behavior under the 
influence of art auctioneer presale price estimates. By using data with over 5,500 pairs of 
transactions and covering a long time period, between 1875-2002, we can control price 
fluctuations due to art market movements and isolate the price impact from auctioneer estimates. 
This unique data set permits us to test three hypotheses in behavioral economics. First, whether 
auctioneer estimates impact art prices. Second, whether high estimates at the time of purchase 
are associated with negative future abnormal returns. This will help us find whether investors 
make appropriate adjustments for these auction biases. Third, we employ the capital asset pricing 
model to control for difference in risks of artworks when measuring abnormal returns. As a 
result, our study complements the existing empirical literature that has focused on analyst 
earnings estimates and stock prices. 
 Our study builds on a small literature on the study on art prices and auctions. Orley 
Ashenfelter (1989) was first to examine whether auctioneer estimates impact art prices. He also 
pointed out the potential agency problem of auction houses in providing price estimates. James 
E. Pesando (1993) and Jianping Mei and Michael Moses (2000) presented strong evidence of 
masterpiece underperformance. Their evidence could be consistent with the view that investors 
overpay for masterpieces under the influence of auctioneer estimates. This paper goes a step 
further by directly examining whether the “masterpiece effect” is directly related to auctioneer 
estimates. Our study will employ a repeated sales regression approach to controls for 
heterogeneity in artworks. In addition, we will measure the return volatility of masterpieces by 
decomposing art risk into systematic and painting specific risks.   
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I describes the art auction 
data set and provides a discussion of sampling biases.  Section II reviews the repeated sales 
regression procedure.  Section III provides an empirical examination of investor credulity based 
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on measuring the influence of auctioneer estimates.  We then offer several alternative 
explanations to our empirical results. Section IV examines investor learning and demonstrate that 
the sample selection bias common in auction data does not affect our credulity results. Section V 
will conclude the paper.  
 
I. Auction Data and Potential Biases 
 
 Since individual works of art have yet to be securitized, studying the value of works of 
art from financial sources is not possible.  Gallery or direct-from-artists prices tend not to be 
reliable or easily obtainable.  Auction prices however are reliable and publicly available. Since 
1973, the two major auction houses in New York, Sotheby's and Christie’s, have also provided 
presale price estimates for all objects up for sale in catalogues. As a result, the prices and their 
estimates can be used as the basis for a data base for determining the change in value of art 
objects over various holding periods as well as the influence of auctioneer presale estimates. 
We created such a database for the American market, principally New York based on 
repeated sales.  We searched the catalogues for all American, 19th Century and Old Master, 
Impressionist and Modern paintings sold at the main sales rooms of Sotheby's and Christie’s 
(and their predecessor firms) from 1950 to 2002.3  If a painting had listed in its provenance a 
prior consummated public sale, at any auction house anywhere, we went back to that auction 
catalogue and recorded the sale price.  In addition to price and date information we also 
recorded auctioneer price estimates when they become available after 1973.4 The New York 
Public Library as well as the Watson Library at the Metropolitan Museum of Art were our major 
sources for this auction data history.  Some paintings had multiple resales over many years 
resulting in a subset of observations that had three public sales with one of the pairs straddling 
1973, the year of the introduction of auctioneer presale price estimates.  Each resale pair was 
considered a unique point in our database that now totals over fifty five hundred entries.   
 As well as analyzing our data as a totality we have also separated it into three popular 
collecting categories.  The first is American Paintings (American) principally created between 
                                                 
3 Our data does not include "bought-in" paintings that did not sell due to the fact that the bid was below reservation 
price. Our data for the year 2002 only includes sales before July.  
4 A small fraction of our data has the presale estimates missing due to missing auction catalogues. We will exclude 
these data in the regression if the relevant variables are missing.  
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1700 and 1950.  The second is Impressionist and Modern Paintings (Impressionists) principally 
created between the third quarters of the 19th and 20th century.  The third is Old Master and 19th 
century paintings (Old Masters) principally created after the 12th century and before the third 
quarter of the 19th century.  For convenience, we will call the first price from each price pair 
“purchase price” and the second price “sale price” from the perspective of the collector for the 
time period between the two transactions. Most artworks bought are held for long time periods 
(on average 28 years).   
 Before 1979 auction houses made their money by charging a fee to the seller, for 
consummated sales, of ten percent. This fee was negotiable, like real estate commissions, based 
on the importance or forecasted value of the work or collection being offered for sale. Items not 
reaching their reserve price were also charged a small fee. After 1979 an additional fee was 
imposed on the successful bidder, the one offering the highest price in the English style outcry 
auction used by most of the world’s major auction houses. This fee was initially set at 10% of 
the winning bid (hammer price) and was not negotiable. Since 1979 this latter free has been 
changed 3 times and is now 19.5% of first $100,000 and 10% of every thing above $100,000 at 
both of New York major auction houses. Thus it is clear that auction houses are interested in 
results that yield high prices and high percent of lots sold.  
The percent of lots sold is dependent on market demand and reservation price.  
Reservation prices are generally set based on sellers’ expectation of market demand and their 
own funding needs. The exact number of works offered with a reserve has grown substantially 
over the last 50 years to a point today where probably over 95 percent of the lots are so offered.  
The typical reserve price is often 50-70% of the low estimate but its actual level is negotiable 
but legally cannot be above the low estimates at New York auctions.  Auction houses often 
compete to get the seller’s business by providing high price estimates.  But they are constrained 
by the fact that the painting may fail to sell if reservation prices are set too high due to high 
price estimates. Moreover, auction houses also have a reputation to protect. Their long-term 
business viability depends on their reputation as experts in the art field who understand market 
conditions.  
 The selection bias in the data set is an important issue that could bear on the 
interpretation of our empirical study. The selection procedures based on multiple sales from 
major US auction houses tend to truncate both sides of the return distribution.  Our sample may 
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suffer from a “backward filled” data bias since our transactions data before 1950 are collected 
only from those paintings that were sold in Christie’s and Sotheby’s after 1950.5  Mei and 
Moses (2002), however, argue that this bias tend to be moderated by several offsetting factors, 
such as masterpieces collected by museums through donations.6 Orley Ashenfelter, Kathryn 
Graddy, and Margaret Stevens (2001) pointed out that another source of selection bias is that 
not all items that are put up for sale at auctions are sold because some final bids may not reach 
the reservation prices. In section IV, we will demonstrate that, under certain conditions, our 
results are unaffected by this sample selection bias. 
  
II. Methodology For Repeat-Sales Regression 
 
 This paper will use the repeat-sales regression (RSR) methodology to measure the 
impact of auctioneer estimates after controlling for overall art market movements.  The RSR 
uses the purchase and sale prices of individual properties to estimate the fluctuations in value of 
an average or representative asset over a particular time period.  William N. Goetzmann (1993), 
Pesando (1993), and Mei and Moses (2002) apply it to the art market. The benefit of using the 
RSR is that the resulting index is based upon price relatives of the same painting that controls 
for the differing quality of the assets. Thus, it does not suffer from arbitrary specifications of a 
hedonic model. 7 
We begin by assuming that the continuously compounded return for a certain art asset i 
in period t, ri,t, may be represented by µt, the continuously compounded return of a price index 
of art, and an error term:  
 
(1)  ri,t = µt + εi,t         
                                                 
5 This bias is similar to the “back-filled” data bias for emerging market stocks where historical data on their returns 
is “back-filled” conditional upon the survival of emerging markets. Thus, data for those emerging markets that 
submerged as result of revolution or economic turmoil were not included, which tend to create a downward bias. We 
like to note, however, unlike Russian bonds and Cuban stocks, paintings from established artists sold in auctions 
seldom disappear from the market completely.  Thus, one can still observe a large number of art pieces sold at estate 
auctions at a fraction of their purchase price.   
6 Goetzmann (1993) also argues that the decision by an owner to sell a work of art (and consequently the occurrence 
of a repeat sale in the sample) could be conditional upon whether or not the value has increased.  
7 The drawback is that the index is constructed from multiple sales, which are a subset of the available transactions.  
Olivier Chanel, Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet, and Victor Ginsburgh (1996) provided a detailed discussion on the 
weakness of the RSR model. 
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where µt, may be thought of as the average return in period t of paintings in the portfolio and the 
painting specific return, εi,t, is assumed to be uncorrelated over time and across paintings. We 
will use sales data about individual paintings to estimate the index µ over some interval t = 1... 
T. Here, µ is a T-dimensional vector whose individual elements are µt. The observed data 
consist of purchase and sales price pairs, Pi,b, and Pi,s, of the individual paintings comprising the 
index, as well as the dates of purchase and sale, which we will designate with bi, and si. Thus, 
the logged price relative for asset i, held between its purchase date bi and its sales date, si, may 
be expressed as  
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 In order to measure the impact of auctioneer presale price estimates on returns, we may 
run a regression like the following, r , where xi is a painting i specific 
variable such as price estimates at purchase. Thus, θ measures directly the impact of xi on art 
returns adjusted for overall market movements.  
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To estimates equation (2), let r represent the N-dimensional vector of logged price 
relatives for N repeated sales observations. Goetzmann (1992) shows that a generalized least-
squares regression of the form, 
 
(3)  ( ) r''ˆ 111 −−−= ΩΧΧΩΧµ ,     
 
provides the maximum-likelihood estimate of µ, where X is a matrix, which has a row of 
dummy variables for each asset in the sample and a column for each holding interval. In 
addition, it also includes a column of xi.  Ω is a weighting matrix, whose weights could be based 
on error estimates from a three-stage-least-square estimation procedure used by Karl E. Case 
and Robert J. Shiller (1987).  
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III. An Empirical Examination of Investor Credulity 
 
A.  Art prices tend to be affected by expert opinion.  
           
Following Ashenfelter (1989), we begin by examining whether auctioneer presale price 
estimates impact art prices. Figure 1 provides a graphic plot of log prices paid by art collectors 
against average auctioneer estimates over the 1973-2002 period. The regression is estimated with 
6114 observations with a R2 of 0.90, using all transactions with price estimates.  Our results 
confirm that auctioneer estimates are highly correlated with the actual prices paid, implying that 
auctioneers do have the ability to predict or influence prices.  Moreover, given the slope 
coefficient is 0.969 with a standard deviation of 0.004, there generally seem to be a slight 
upward bias for high price paintings, indicating the actual price paid is often less than the 
average of high- and low- estimates. Given the fact that the regression is based on paintings 
actually sold and the highest bid for unsold pictures is generally below the lower estimate, our 
results suggest that there is an upward bias for high price paintings. This result is consistent with 
the view of Kent, Hirshleifer, and Teoh, (2002) who point out that the problem of credulity is 
likely to be greater for firms with high valuations or firms that are able to weave hard-to-refute 
stories to tell investors about future prospects. They note that the empirical findings of inferior 
performance of stocks with high market/book ratios (Chan et al., 2001) are consistent with 
credulity. 
To find the persistency of this result, we also run the above regression annually from 
1973-2002. We allow the intercept and the slope coefficients to vary over time.8 The results on 
the slope coefficient and goodness-of-fit (R2) is presented in a graphic plot in Figure 2. We can 
see that the persistence of upward bias for high priced paintings, since the slope estimates are 
below one for most years. The mean of the slope coefficient is 0.966 with a standard deviation of 
0.006. Thus, the slope coefficient is quite close to but different from one.  The slight tilt 
downward in the slope of the regression allows the price estimates to be somewhat biased 
upwards for the high price paintings. This result is consistent with the view that auction house 
performs a delicate balance between their long-term reputation and short-term interest. As a 
                                                 
8 By allowing for time-varying intercept, we have also removed a common factor which may cause cross-sectional 
correlation among the residuals. Keane and Runkle (1998) pointed out that the t-statistics for the slope coefficient in 
Figure 1 may bias upward if no adjustment is made for the cross-sectional correlation.  
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result, they will try to maintain an overall unbiasedness in their estimates, but tilted their 
estimates upward for expensive paintings, since they can benefit the most from such bias if 
investors are credulous.  
An alternative way of measuring the influence or forecast ability of auctioneer presale 
price estimates is to run the following regression (4):  
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where si,Ρ  is the average of the high- and low estimates. D1,i is a dummy variable indicating that 
the sale of the painting happened after 1973 and information on si,Ρ  is not missing.  Here we 
adjust the price estimate by the original purchase price so that 
bi
si
P ,
,Ρ
H
siP ,
stands for expected holding 
period returns. In order to measure the impact the spread of the sale estimates, i.e., the difference 
between high- and low- estimates, we also include the difference ( ) in regression (4).  
We then scale it by the average estimate for that object at the time of the sale (
L
siP ,−
siP , ).  Our 
hypothesis is, if investors are credulous and they are given two paintings with same average 
estimates, they maybe inclined to pay more for the painting with a higher . We will estimate 
equation (4) using all artworks as well as for the three collecting subcategories. Thus, if 
auctioneer estimates simply forecast market returns and have no impact on prices of individual 
artworks, then we would expect α and β to be close to zero.  
H
siP ,
The regression results are reported in Table 1.  Our results are uniform across all 
collecting categories. Average estimates of sale price significantly affect returns, implying the 
investors at the sale are influenced by the price estimates when they decide how much to pay for 
the paintings. Our α estimate for American artworks indicates that a 1% increase in sale price 
estimates on average tend to increase price (excess returns) by 0.66%. Moreover, our β estimate 
for American artworks suggests that a 1% increase in estimate spread on average tend to increase 
excess returns by 0.049%. Thus, our study seems to suggest that art investors are likely 
influenced by price estimates. They tend to pay more for paintings with high estimate and they 
tend to pay even more when the estimate spread is larger. 
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 An interesting result from Table 1 is that the impact of auctioneer presale price estimates 
seems to be highest for Old Masters.9 Given the fact that Old Master paintings, on average were 
created much earlier than American and Impressionist paintings, investors will tend to have less 
information about them. There is a wider difference of opinion as to authenticity, quality and 
condition for many of the works of art created 200-400 years ago than there would be about 
works created 50-125 years ago. Most major Old Master pictures are in museums so more of the 
work available is by lesser known artists.  However the supply of Impressionist and Modern 
work by the well known masters is still abundant.  Thus the buying public has less need for 
expert advice on whom is important. As a result, it might be easier for auctioneers to use their 
“expertise” to sway potential investors in the Old Master market. Thus, our results are consistent 
with the view that investors are more credulous when they have less information.  
 
B. Underperformance due to the Influence of Auctioneer Estimates 
 
The above study has shown that investors are influenced by auctioneer estimates. But this 
does not necessarily imply that investors are credulous. If auctioneers do have information on the 
value or future performance of paintings, then investors could be simply taking advantages of the 
information and buying according to their suggestions. In order to prove credulity, we at least 
need to show that investors have been influenced by information that is adverse to their future 
returns. Our first test involves a simple study in which we compare the return performance of 
two groups of paintings with triple sales. Our first group (A) of paintings consists of those whose 
1st sale occurred before 1973 with no price estimates, and 2nd and 3rd sale happened after 1973, 
when auctioneer presale price estimates were made available. As a result, the 1st sale price is not 
influenced by auctioneer estimates while the 2nd and 3rd prices are.  Our second group (B) of 
paintings consists of those whose 1st  and 2nd sales occurred before 1973 and 3rd sale happened 
after 1973. If price estimates have an upward pressure on prices, we would expect that the first 
holding period return for A will be higher than that of B. This is because the 2nd sale price of A is 
under the influence of estimates while that of B is not. On the other hand, if the auctioneer 
presale estimates have lead to high purchase prices and then lower return for the future, we  
would expect that the second holding period return for A will be lower than that of B. 
                                                 
9 A simple t-test indicate that both α and β for Old Masters is higher then those of Impressionist at 1% significance 
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A  1   2           3 
   
B  1      2    1973            3 
   
Table 2 presents our empirical findings. We discover that, while the overall holding 
period returns (1st to 3rd) is only slightly different (1.2%), the first holding period return for A is 
3.97% higher than that of B with a statistical significance of 1%. Moreover, the second holding 
period return for A is 3.79% lower than that of B. Both findings are consistent with the view that 
investors are influenced by auctioneer estimate information which then turns out to be adverse to 
their future returns. 
Critics may argue, however, that while the above results are suggestive of investor 
credulity, its estimation procedure did not adjust for differences in time periods and market 
movements. To address this concern, we will evaluate the impact of auctioneer estimate on 
future returns by explicitly control for market movements in the following regression: 
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where D2,i is a dummy variable indicating that the purchase of the painting happened after 1973 
and bi,Ρ  is the average of the high- and low-estimates at the purchase.10 The results are reported 
in Table 3 while Figure 3 provide a simple plot of art returns and price estimates for Old Master 
paintings.  Our results are uniform across all categories: the higher the purchase price estimates, 
the more the future under-performance of the artworks with respect to art market indices. 
Moreover, our results are robust to whether nominal prices or real prices are used in the 
regressions. To understand the economic significance of our results, an average Old Master 
Painting has an average price estimate of $19,200 during the period of 1981-1985.  A one 
                                                                                                                                                             
level.  
10 In the second exercise, we use prices deflated by the US CPI index, since the nominal value of art may change 
due to inflation. 
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standard deviation increase in price estimate of $19,400 would increase ln( bi,Ρ ) by 9.8, which 
would on average imply a drop of future return by 29%!  
While the results in Table 3 suggest investors tend to receive negative future abnormal 
returns if they pay the high price estimates, they could receive even less if they pay above the 
high price estimates in a bidding war. To access the impact of over payment, i.e. the difference 
between actual price paid and the price estimate at purchase, we add the overpayment term to   
the regression (5) and obtain: 
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where Pi,b is the actual purchase price and bi,Ρ  is the average of the high- and low-estimates at 
the purchase. The results are reported in Table 4.  Our results are uniform across all categories: 
the higher the purchase price estimates, the more the future under-performance of the artworks. 
Moreover, the higher the over payment, the lower the future abnormal return.  To understand the 
economic significance of our results, a 1% over payment on Old Master Painting tends to reduce 
future return by 0.24%!  
One of the difficult tasks of this study is to show that our results are because credulous 
investors believe analyst forecast and not because smart analysts simply reflect the beliefs (or 
exuberance) of the investors.11  While our results here are not conclusive, it nonetheless suggests 
that the latter is unlikely.  Unless the decision to provide price estimates coincides with a 
permanent upward shift in investor sentiment, it is hard to explain why the year 1973 has had 
such an important impact on art returns. It is worth noting that, until very recently when internet 
has made art price information widely available, auction catalogue was probably the most 
important source of price information for art objects on sale. Moreover, heterogeneity and 
infrequent trading makes it hard to evaluate works of art even for a knowledgeable person. As a 
result, the price estimates were an important part of the information set based on which investors 
form their price expectations. As a result, auction houses are in a good position to affect and not 
just reflect investor expectation.  
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Our case is further strengthened by a common advice given to their clients by art dealers, 
which is to buy the best (i.e. most expensive) artworks they can afford. This advice presumes 
that masterpieces of well-known artists will outperform the market. In other words, masterpieces 
might have a higher expected return than middle-level and lower-level works of art. Casting 
doubt on this popular advice, Pesando (1993) was first to show that masterpieces (defined by 
their high prices) actually tend to under perform the market. 12   
Why would auction houses recommend expensive paintings to their clients while there is 
no (or even opposing) evidence of masterpiece over-performance?  We suspect that it could be 
due to their self-interest. As we know, auction house commissions (both seller commission and 
buyer premium) are based on the prices of art fetches at auction. The higher the price, the higher 
the commission. So to the extent auctioneer estimates could influence prices, auction houses 
would naturally inflate their price estimates and recommend investors to buy “masterpieces”. 
This paper establishes a statistical relationship between price estimates and future returns. We 
extend the results of earlier studies by showing that the underperformance could be due to 
investor credulity by paying dearly for paintings with high price estimates.  
Our results here are consistent with those in behavioral finance. Firms tend to “manage” 
their earnings when they are selling equity. Teoh et al. (1998a, b) and Rangan (1998) discovered 
that accruals tend to be abnormally high at the time of new IPO and seasoned equity issues, 
suggesting firm earnings are reported higher than cash flow.  Teoh and Wong (2001) also found 
that greater earnings management is associated with more optimistic errors in analyst earnings 
forecasts both in new and seasoned equity issues. They found that greater earnings management 
at the time of a new issue is associated with more adverse future abnormal stock returns. This 
suggests “…investors, possibly under the influence of analysts, do not adequately discount for 
earnings manipulation.”13 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 See Raghuram Rajan and Henri Servaes (1997) for a detailed discussion on the difficulty of separating the two in 
the IPO literature.  
12 Pesando’s (1993) discovery was based on repeated sales of modern prints from 1977-1992. Since his data only 
cover prints that tend to have much lower value when compared to American, Old Masters and Impressionists 
paintings, one may wonder if this underperformance exists for truly expensive artworks. Moreover, Goetzmann 
(1996) found no evidence of underperformance of masterpieces. Using repeated sales data covering American, Old 
Master, Impressionist and Modern paintings, Mei and Moses (2002) further examined the performance of 
masterpieces.  They found strong evidence on the underperformance of masterpieces. 
13 See Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002 ) for further discussion.  
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C. Do Auctioneer Estimates Reduce Risk? 
 
   An alternative explanation to our results is that auctioneer estimates provide valuable 
information to investors by reducing the risk in art investment.14 The auctioneer presale estimates 
are particularly valuable for expensive paintings because market participants believe that they 
tend to be the most risky.  Thus, investors are willing to pay a premium for masterpieces when 
price estimates are available. To examine the validity of this explanation, we need to 
systematically estimate the return risk of art works. This is not a trivial task, since artworks do 
not trade very often and they have different holding periods and thus are under the influence of 
different overall market movements. We will approach this problem by using the classic capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) to decompose the return risk into systematic and painting specific 
risks. As a result, we have two possible explanations related to risk.   
  The first explanation would be masterpieces have smaller systematic risk. As a result, 
investors would be willing to pay a premium for them relative to other works of art due to 
smaller market risk exposure. To test this hypothesis, we partition our data into two groups for 
each year based on purchase prices (or price estimates) and define those whose prices are in the 
top one third to be masterpieces. Because it is not possible to estimate stock market betas for 
each artwork, we assume that all masterpieces (non-masterpieces) have the same betas. Here, we 
allow betas to vary over the two groups and over two time periods, before and after 1973, to take 
into account a possible change in betas due to the availability of price estimates or other 
changing market conditions.  For simplicity, we will use the classic CAPM model to estimate the 
systematic risks of artworks and we will employ the S&P 500 as the market index. Using 
equation (2) and the CAPM, we have: 
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14 The expert’s job is meant to basically reduce the range and weight in the tails of the density function of prices for 
a work of art. The data in Table 2 tends to bear this out. The standard deviation of the objects sold during the era of 
no estimates (B 1 T0 2) 27.02 is much higher than the standard deviation of returns during the era of estimates (A 2 
T0 3) 14.41.   
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where M (NM) stands for masterpieces, (non-masterpieces). Note that we may not have either 
the first term if the purchase happened after 1973 or the second term if the sale happened before 
1972. Re-arranging terms and adding a constant to measure the Jensen’s α (risk adjusted excess 
return), we have the following regression: 
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Here we will use return to the United States Treasury Bills Total Return Index as the risk free 
rate. The sources of this data are from Federal Reserve Board and Global Financial Data (5th 
edition).  We employ the same Case and Shiller (1987) estimation procedure to estimate (8) 
separately for the masterpieces and non-masterpieces. The results are reported in Table 5.  
   There are several interesting results. First, with the exception of Impressionist in the post-
1973 period, masterpieces tend to have lower systematic risk than non-masterpieces. Thus, 
market participants were wrong if they believed that masterpieces tend to be risky.  Second, there 
is a substantial drop in systematic risk after 1972. This could be a confluence of many factors. 
While the availability of prices estimates may have contributed to the drop, Japanese influence in 
the 1980s and art market correction in the 1990s may have also reduced correlation with the US 
equity market. It is interesting to note that there is little difference in systematic risks between 
the American masterpieces and non-masterpieces after 1973.  While impressionist masterpieces 
do have higher betas, the opposite was true for Old Masters. Lastly, after adjusting for systematic 
risk, masterpieces tend to have a more negative excess return (Jensen’s α) than non-
masterpieces. For example, while artworks generally tend to have a negative excess return after 
adjusting for risk, a typical American masterpiece would have a -21% excess return (0.75% 
annually on a 28 year holding period)) comparing to –7% return for non-masterpiece. The result 
is statistically significant at 1% level for Old Masters and All collecting category. Thus, 
systematic risk cannot explain the “masterpiece effect”.   
 The second explanation related to risk would be masterpieces have smaller idiosyncratic 
risk. Idiosyncratic risk matters because art investment is lumpy. As a result, investors could be 
paying a premium for masterpiece relative to other works of art due to smaller painting specific 
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risk. To obtain the annual idiosyncratic volatility  estimate, we take the squared residuals 
from (8) and scale it by (si-bi). We next sum them up for all paintings sold before 1973 (or 
purchased after 1973) and divided it by the total number of paintings sold during the period.  
That is: 
2
εσ
1
1972
2
2
,1 Nbs
is ii
i∑
<



−=
ησ ε , where N1 is the total number of paintings sold before 1973, 
and  is the squared residuals in equation (8).15 We discard the sample of paintings bought 
before 1973 and sold after 1973 to get a clean estimate of idiosyncratic volatility before and 
after 1973.  We then compute two F-statistics, which is the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility of 
non-masterpiece over masterpieces.16 Under the assumption of annual homoscedasticity across 
the two time periods, we can show that the F-statistic has a distribution with the degrees of 
freedom equal to the numbers of paintings used in the computation of the volatility minus one. 
2
iη
  The results are reported in Table 6.  Our results are uniform across all categories that 
idiosyncratic volatility of masterpieces is smaller than those of non-masterpieces.  Our 
estimate on the American masterpieces indicates that annual volatility is 0.063 compared to 
0.075 for non-masterpieces after 1973.  Moreover, volatility has generally declined after price 
estimates were made available after 1973. Thus, price estimates tend to help reduce future return 
volatility. Thus, idiosyncratic risk may help explain why investors would pay a premium for 
masterpieces.  However, since paintings are usually bought by wealthy individuals and large 
institutions, it is a puzzle why investors would pay more because painting specific volatility can 
be easily diversified.  
2
εσ
  To further test the robustness of our results in Table 5, we also employ a three-factor model 
of Eugene Fama and Kenneth French (1996) to control for systematic risks.  Following equation 
(8), we allow the factor loadings to vary over the two groups and over two time periods, before 
and after 1973, to take into account a possible change in factor loadings due to the availability of 
price estimates or other changing market conditions. Replacing the CAPM model equation (7) by 
the Fama and French (1996) three-factor model, we obtain: 
                                                 
15 By the same token, 2
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1973.  
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where Sm is for the “small minus big”  size factor and Hm stands for the “high minus low” book-
to-market factor.  For simplicity, we here only report the abnormal returns in Table 7. Our results 
are quite similar to those reported in Table 5. After adjusting for systematic risk, masterpieces 
tend to have a more negative excess return than non-masterpieces. Again, risk cannot explain the 
“masterpiece effect”. Moreover, the so-called winner’s curse, the tendency for buyers to overbid 
at auctions, would have a hard time explain the effect either, since the impact of overbidding at 
the purchase may be cancelled out at the sale if the new buyer also has a tendency to overbid.17  
  There is however a totally different explanation to our results that has little to do with art as 
investment. Rather art becomes consumption good. In this case, collectors buy paintings for their 
aesthetic value or other pleasures associated with owning works of art.  When auctioneers put up 
a high estimate for a painting, it could indicate high fashion of the time or other consumption 
values. It is conceivable that collectors may pay more for these paintings despite their negative 
abnormal future returns, because the high consumption values could compensate for the lower 
returns.   
 
IV.  Sale Rates and Selection Bias 
 
A. Why do Sale Rates Change Over Time? 
 
An effective strategy against auctioneer bias is refusing to pay the high prices suggested 
by their estimates. Given the upward bias of price estimates and the high reservation price set 
based on the estimates, the painting may fail to sell at the auction (i.e. “be bought-in”) if we have 
shrewd investors. If more and more investors learn over time that there is an inherent bias in 
 
16  and . 2
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17 The impact of overbidding would exactly offset each other if the overbidding is proportional to prices.  
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auctioneer estimates, then more and more paintings will fail to sell at auctions if auctioneer do 
not significantly alter their behavior. Here we have some preliminary evidence that this may be 
the case. Figure 4 presents a graphic plot of sale rates for various collecting categories for one of 
the world’s major auction house, Sotheby New York.  We can clearly see that there is a 
downward trend for all collecting categories, implying a higher percentage of paintings have 
been unsold in recent auctions.  
This evidence on declining sale rates could be quite interesting, because it may suggest 
that art buyers do care about future returns. They have refused to offer high bids for a larger 
percentage of paintings recently.  This cast some doubt on the fashion or consumption 
explanation. If high price estimates simply proxy for high consumption level or “hot” styles, then 
one may wonder why collectors have stopped chasing them and why auctioneers (or sellers) have 
consistently priced an increasingly large percentage of their products out of the market.  
  There may be several reasons why auctioneers have not significantly adjusted their price 
estimates to counter the declining sale rates. First, self-interest may lead them to believe that the 
declining sale rates could be temporary. Second and more importantly, competition among 
auction houses could lead to a bidding war on price estimates, because the sellers may be 
tempted by the prospects of fetching higher prices if they believe investors are credulous. This is 
especially the case when auction houses sometime provide financing or minimum sale price 
guarantees based on the lower price estimates.  The interaction among sellers, auctioneers and 
buyers is an interesting topic. Unfortunately, data on reservation prices are hard to obtain.   
 
B. Does Sample Selection Bias Affect Our Results? 
 
  A main statistical feature of our study is that it is based on artworks sold at the auction. 
Thus, we do not observe the prices of those paintings that are unsold at the auctions. While we 
argue in Section IIIA that the upward bias of price estimates with respect to masterpieces should 
not be affected by the selection bias, it makes us wonder whether the same can be said about our 
credulity results derived from regression (5). In this subsection, we will demonstrate that, under 
certain conditions, our results are unaffected by the sample selection bias. We begin by assuming 
that the errors in regression (5) follow a normal distribution:  
 
10/16/2002 
19 
  
(10)   ))(,0(~,)ln(lnln 2
11
,2
1
, σεεγµ ii
s
bt
it
s
bt
itbii
s
bt
tbiisi bsNPDPPr
i
i
i
i
i
i
−++=−= ∑∑∑
+=+=+=
 
 
For simplicity, we will re-write (10) as: 
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where X1 would include the exogenous variables in the first two terms of equation (12), and X2 
would be )ln( ,,3 bii PD . According to William Greene (2000, pages 899-902),  
 
(13)   ),()()]ln(|[ 21, iiisiii bsXaXPyy ασλγφ −++=>E  
 
where ( ) σγφα )/()ln( 21, iisii bsXaXP −−−= . Here, we assume that a painting will be sold if 
)ln( ,siPiy φ>  and λ(α) is the inverse Mills Ratio.18 It is then easy to show that: 
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Equation (14) shows that γˆ  is the marginal effect of price estimates at purchase, which is 
estimated using regression (5) conditional on sold artworks. From equation (14) and (15), we can 
see that the true γ has the same sign as γˆ . Moreover, the estimated negative impact γˆ  is smaller 
in absolute value than the actual γ. As a result, our conclusion of the negative relationship 
between price estimates and future abnormal returns is not affected by the sample selection bias.  
 
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
This paper constructs a new data set from art auctions that include auctioneer estimates 
when they are available to examine the credulity of art investors. It complements existing 
empirical literature on behavioral economics, which focus on analyst earnings estimates and 
stock prices. We find that auctioneer estimates are highly and significantly related to prices paid 
by investors for artworks. High estimates at the time of purchase are associated with adverse 
subsequent abnormal returns. These results are consistent with the view that investors are 
credulous. They do not discount fully the strategic incentives of auctioneers. However, we have 
some preliminary evidence that investors have made some adjustment recently for systematic 
biases in provided information. So our results seems to be consistent with the view that “You can 
fool some of people some of the time, but not all the people all the time.” 
In addition to examining the credulity hypothesis, our study has also studied the validity 
of two alternative explanations to our empirical findings—risk and fashion. While we find it 
inconceivable that our results are driven exclusively by risk considerations, we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that art is consumption good and thus its investment returns are of secondary 
concerns to investors. While it is possible that the lower returns we documented for paintings 
with high estimates are offset by psychological rewards associated with market fashion of the 
time, the evidence on declining sale rates documented in Section IV seem to suggest that 
investors do care about future returns. They have refused to offer high bids for a larger 
percentage of paintings recently.  This cast some doubt on the fashion explanation. But we 
cannot rule it out.  
If investors are indeed credulous as indicated by our preliminary evidence, then they are 
subject to manipulation by interested parties, such as auction houses and other providers of 
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information to the market. Recent conflict of interest scandals on Wall Street suggest that 
exploitation of investor credulity could be quite pervasive in the market place.19  In that case, 
there might be some interesting policy implications for government regulation. To protect the 
unwary, government could provide better education to investors or mandate a warning label on 
auction catalogs that warns investors against the agency problem.  Much like warnings on 
cigarette package for smokers, it could warn that the price estimates could be upward biased.  
While this may have a dampening effect on the alleged art market euphoria such as the 
Impressionist bubble of the 1980s, we are doubtful that more government intervention could 
prevent the Japanese investors from paying tens of millions for Van Gogh paintings.  
Experience in the art market may also shed light on the effectiveness of two policy tools 
for government to curb speculation: transaction tax and trading halt, such as the circuit breaker 
on the stock exchange. Since transaction cost in art market is certainly among the highest in all 
asset transactions, the existence of the Impressionist bubble cast doubt on the effectiveness of 
Tobin’s tax to curb market speculation. Moreover, since the art auction market is as illiquid as 
you can get—it trades only once every six month at major seasonal auctions, it implies that a 
mere trading halt probably could not do much to cool the speculative craze of frenzied investors. 
  Our research has left many interesting issues. While the paper has studied the impact of 
auctioneer estimates on investors, we have not examined how investor behavior influence 
auction price estimates. It might be interesting to study the impact of auction house competition 
on price estimates. Another interesting question is whether sellers are credulous as well by 
offering their paintings to auction houses that offer them the highest price estimates.  In addition, 
we have also not studied the optimal bidding strategies for rational investors when price 
estimates are upward biased and most investors are credulous. We will leave these for future 
research.    
                                                 
19 Recent the New York State attorney general has made numerous investigation into leading Wall Street firms for 
issuing inflated investment ratings and offering “hot” IPOs in turn for investment banking business from telcom 
companies.   
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TABLE 1--TESTS OF INFLUENCE OF AUCTIONEER ESTIMATES 
 American Impressionist Old Master All 
Sample Period 1941-2000 1941-2000 1900-2000 1875-2000 
α 0.662 0.580 0.687 0.665 
t-stat [17.81] [22.12] [20.60] [35.91] 
β 0.061 0.040 0.290 0.076 
t-stat [1.757] [2.332] [6.651] [5.034] 
      
R2 0.773 0.800 0.651 0.676 
OBS 968 1927 2345 5606 
Note: Three-stage-generalized-least square RSR estimation of Case and Shiller (1989) are used 
to estimate: ∑∑
+=+=
+⋅


 −+⋅

+= i
i
i
i
s
bt
iti
si
L
si
H
si
i
bi
si
s
bt
ti DP
PPDP
Pr
1
,1
,
,,
,1
,
,
1
)(lnln εβαµ , where D1,i is a 
dummy variable indicating that the sale of the painting happened after 1973 and information 
on si,Ρ  is not missing. ( ) is the difference between high- and low- estimates at the sale. LsiHsi PP ,, −
 
 
 
TABLE 2-- SUMMARY STATISTICS OF AVERAGE RETURNS 
    OBS   1st To 2nd (%) 2nd To 3rd  (%) 1st  To 3rd   (%) 
A 1st Sale 227 Mean 10.73 6.28 9.52 
 Prior 1973  STD 6.40 14.41 4.17 
       
B 1st & 2nd Sale 256 Mean 6.76 10.07 8.32 
 Prior 1973  STD 27.02 5.20 3.96 
       
 Difference   3.97** -3.79** 1.20** 
** indicates significance level at 1%. 
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TABLE 3--TESTS OF FUTURE UNDERPERFORMANCE 
 American Impressionist Old Master All 
Sample Period 1941-2000 1941-2000 1900-2000 1875-2000 
Panel A: Test using Nominal Value for bi,Ρ    
γ -0.011 -0.005  -0.030 -0.010 
t-stat [-2.062] [-1.375] [-5.984] [-4.476] 
      
R2 0.758 0.791 0.636 0.666 
Panel B: Test using Real Value for bi,Ρ    
γ -0.020 -0.007 -0.060 -0.019 
t-stat [-2.190] [-1.275] [-6.176] [-4.728] 
     
R2 0.758 0.791 0.636 0.666 
OBS 814 1699 2078 4957 
Note: Three-stage-generalized-least square RSR estimation of Case and Shiller (1989) are used 
to estimate: ∑∑
+=+=
++= i
i
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)ln( εγµ . Here D2,i is a dummy variable indicating that the 
purchase of the painting happened after 1973, Pi,b is the actual purchase price and bi,Ρ  is the 
average of the high- and low-estimates at the purchase.  
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TABLE 4--TESTS OF FUTURE UNDERPERFORMANCE WITH OVERPAYMENT 
 American Impressionist Old Master All 
Sample Period 1941-2000 1941-2000 1900-2000 1875-2000 
Panel A: Test using Nominal Value for bi,Ρ    
γ -0.008 -0.003  -0.025 -0.007 
t-stat [-1.607] [-1.065] [-4.895] [-3.216] 
ϕ -0.099 -0.211  -0.237 -0.205 
t-stat [-1.655] [-3.746] [-4.206] [-6.627] 
     
R2 0.759 0.783 0.636 0.666 
OBS 814 1699 2078 4957 
Note: Three-stage-generalized-least square RSR estimation of Case and Shiller (1989) are used 
to estimate: ∑∑
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indicating that the purchase of the painting happened after 1973 and bi,Ρ  is the average of the 
high- and low-estimates at the purchase. 
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TABLE 5—ESTIMATES OF ABNORMAL RETURN 
 American Impressionist Old Master All 
Sample Period 1941-2000 1941-2000 1900-2000 1875-2000 
A: Estimates for Masterpieces   
αΜ -0.217 -0.380 -0.414a) -0.233 a) 
t-stat [-2.782] [-5.504] [-6.491] [-7.178] 
β1,Μ 0.687 0.815 0.172 a) 0.320 a) 
t-stat [10.92] [18.25] [5.647] [11.74] 
β2,Μ 0.102 0.192 a) 0.157 a) 0.076 
t-stat [2.240] [5.026] [4.159] [3.119] 
     
R2 0.368 0.438 0.023 0.031 
OBS 300 579 710 1589 
B: Estimates for Non-Masterpieces   
αΝΜ -0.079 -0.236 -0.140 -0.123 
t-stat [-1.208] [-4.343] [-2.946] [-4.358] 
β1,ΝΜ 0.824 0.898 0.443 0.582 
t-stat [17.68] [25.65] [21.21] [32.97] 
β2,ΝΜ 0.109 0.101 0.274 0.129 
t-stat [2.966] [3.426] [9.700] [7.235] 
     
R2 0.403 0.417 0.198 0.254 
OBS 654 1237 1511 3402 
Note: Three-stage-generalized-least square RSR estimation of Case and Shiller (1989) are used 
to estimate , k=M, NM.  ∑ ∑∑
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a) indicates a difference of same coefficients between masterpieces and non-masterpieces that is 
significant at 1% level. 
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TABLE 6—ESTIMATES OF IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK 
 American Impressionist Old Master All 
Sample Period 1941-2000 1941-2000 1900-2000 1875-2000 
A: Estimates for Masterpieces   
A: Annual Variance Before 1973   
2
1εσ  0.031 0.039 0.143 0.118 
B: Annual Variance After 1973   
2
2εσ  0.063 0.092 0.071 0.078 
   
B: Estimates for Non-Masterpieces   
A: Annual Variance Before 1973   
2
1εσ  0.154 0.192 0.165 0.179 
B: Annual Variance After 1973   
2
2εσ  0.075 0.102 0.118 0.099 
     
P-value (F1) 0.003 0.000 0.249 0.005 
P-Value (F2) 0.084 0.157 0.000 0.000 
Note: Three-stage-generalized-least square RSR estimation of Case and Shiller (1989) are used 
to estimate , k=M, NM.  is the 
annual volatility. 
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TABLE 7—ESTIMATES OF ABNORMAL RETURN USING FF FACTORS 
 American Impressionist Old Master All 
Sample Period 1941-2000 1941-2000 1900-2000 1875-2000 
A: Estimates for Masterpieces   
αΜ -0.161 -0.324 a) -0.417 a) -0.241 a) 
t-stat [-2.006] [-5.289] [-7.590] [-7.534] 
     
R2 0.397 0.503 0.162 0.227 
B: Estimates for Non-Masterpieces   
αΝΜ 0.003 -0.151 -0.113 -0.094 
t-stat [0.051] [-3.027] [-2.345] [-3.118] 
     
R2 0.417 0.476 0.397 0.421 
Note: Three-stage-generalized-least square RSR estimation of Case and Shiller (1989) are used 
to estimate the following regression: 
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k=M, NM.  
a) indicates a difference of same coefficients between masterpieces and non-masterpieces that is 
significant at 1% level. 
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FIGURE 1: REGRESSION OF PRICES ON AUCTIONEER ESTIMATES 
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FIGURE 2: THE SLOPE COEFFICIENTS AND R-SQUARES  
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Note: Slope coefficients (ds) and R-squares for the following cross-sectional regressions over the 
time periods between 1973 and 2002.  .2002,...,1973,lnln ,,, =++= sPdcP sisisssi υ  
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FIGURE 3: OLD MASTER PAINTINGS RESALE RETURNS 
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FIGURE 4: SALE RATE DECLINING OVER TIME 
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